Career ambitions and legislative participation: the moderating effect of electoral institutions by Høyland, Bjørn et al.
  
Bjørn Høyland, Sara Hobolt, Simon Hix 
Career ambitions and legislative 
participation: the moderating effect of 
electoral institutions 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Høyland , Bjørn, Hobolt, Sara and Hix, Simon Career ambitions and 
legislative participation: the moderating effect of electoral institutions. British Journal of Political 
Science . ISSN 0007-1234 (In Press) 
 
 
© 2016 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68395/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
Career Ambitions and Legislative
Participation: The Moderating Effect of
Electoral Institutions
BJØRN HØYLAND∗, SARA B. HOBOLT†AND SIMON HIX‡
forthcoming in the British Journal of Political Science
∗Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. PO Box 1097 Blindern,
NO-0317 Oslo. bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no
†Professor, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. Houghton
St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. S.B.Hobolt@lse.ac.uk
‡Harold Laski Professor, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Po-
litical Science. Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. s.hix@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
What motivates politicians to engage in legislative activities? In multi-level
systems politicians may be incentivized by ambitions to advance their ca-
reers either at the state or federal level. We argue that the design of the
electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives.
Analyzing a unique dataset of both ‘stated’ and ‘realized’ career ambitions
of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) we find that those who
seek to move from the European to the national (state) level participate less
in legislative activities than those who plan to stay at the European (federal)
level. For MEPs who aim to move to the state level, attendance and par-
ticipation in legislative activities is substantively lower amongst legislators
from candidate-centered systems. Importantly, the effect of career ambi-
tions on legislative participation is stronger in candidate-centered systems
than in party-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsive-
ness associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of
legislative activity.
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In representative democracies politicians are sometimes forced to choose be-
tween actions that will further their political careers inside a legislature or party
and actions that will be popular with the public, and hence increase their re-
election chances. These choices are particularly complex in multi-level systems,
where politicians can pursue careers at either the regional or national level.1 The
career choices that legislators make, and the actions that follow from these choices,
are central to the functioning of representative democracy; yet we know little about
how political ambitions play out in multi-level contexts. In this paper, we argue
that the effect of individual ambition on legislative behavior is crucially shaped
by the electoral system, which influences inter alia whether politicians have in-
centives to cater primarily to those actors who control candidate selection (either
locally or centrally) or primarily to voters in their constituencies. Hence, there
is trade-off, conditioned by electoral institutions, between dedicated and profes-
sional legislators on the one hand and politicians who are visible and accountable
to their electorates on the other hand.
To investigate how electoral institutions moderate the relationship between
career ambitions and legislative participation in a multi-level political system, we
take advantage of the variation in electoral rules governing European Parliament
elections and examine the career ambition and behavior of the Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs). We posit that politicians seeking political career
progression either at the state or federal level adjust their legislative participation
carefully to increase their chances of promotion at their preferred level of gov-
ernment. Such personal ambitions are moderated by the structural incentives of
1Samuels 2003; Stolz 2003; Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009; Borchert 2011; Daniel
2015; Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard 2015.
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the electoral system.2 In a ‘candidate-centered’ electoral system, such as open-list
proportional representation, legislators who want to be re-elected need to devote
greater attention to their constituency regardless of which office they are seeking.
Once a high profile has been established locally, this lowers the cost of transferring
from one political arena to another. In contrast, in a ‘party-centered’ electoral sys-
tem, such as closed-list proportional representation, legislators primarily need to
be on good terms with their party leaders, who control candidate selection. The
effect of career ambition on legislative participation thus varies across electoral
systems. Politicians in candidate-centered systems are likely to be less willing to
spend time on legislative activities in particular if they seek a career at a different
electoral level, as their need to spend time on developing a constituency profile
is greater. In contrast, in party-centered systems, politicians who aim to further
their career can afford to focus more on legislative activities since their party, not
their constituency, matters most for their career advancement at both the regional
or national levels.
We test these propositions using original data on the career ambitions, both
‘stated’ and ‘realized’, of MEPs. We employ data from surveys of the MEPs to
identify their ‘stated ambitions’, as well as data on post-parliamentary careers to
identify MEPs’ ‘realized ambitions’. The European Parliament is a useful labora-
tory within which to investigate these issues because the same set of politicians
in a single legislature are elected under different electoral systems in each Eu-
ropean Union (EU) member state. Also, because the European Parliament is a
low-salience legislature, a large proportion of politicians harbor ambitions to re-
2Sartori 1976; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 2000; Farrell and Scully
2007.
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turn to national politics. Our findings show that these career ambitions have a
substantive effect on legislative participation in candidate-centered systems, caus-
ing those MEPs with national level ambitions to participate substantively less.
The career-ambition effect is weaker in party-centered systems. Importantly, this
suggests that candidate-centered systems, which are generally seen to encourage
politicians to be more responsive to voters, can reduce the quality of legislative
decision-making, at least in low-salience legislatures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first situate our contri-
bution in the literature on career ambitions of politicians in multi-level systems,
legislative behavior and electoral institutions, before presenting our theoretical ar-
gument and hypotheses concerning how electoral institutions condition the effect
of career ambitions on legislative participation. We subsequently introduce the
data and the methods we use in the analysis, before presenting the results. The
conclusion discusses the wider implications of our findings.
Career Ambitions, Legislative Behavior and Electoral Rules
Legislators have different ambitions about their future careers.3 Some may wish
to remain for multiple terms in the same legislature, some will aspire to higher
office, while others may wish to leave politics altogether. Such political ambitions
shape the choices legislators make in their current positions. As Schlesinger noted
in his seminal book, Ambition and Politics, ‘a politician’s behavior is a response
to his office goals’.4 To achieve these goals, a politician must adapt his behavior
to satisfy not only current constituents, but also potential future constituents:
3Scarrow 1997; Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009.
4Schlesinger 1966, p. 6.
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‘our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate he hopes to
win tomorrow’.5 Several studies have applied and extended the basic tenet of this
‘ambition theory’ in the US context.6 Hibbing’s study of legislative behavior in the
US House of Representatives, for example, confirms that politicians behave with an
eye toward the constituency they hope to serve tomorrow.7 He demonstrates that
representatives who want to trade constituencies change their behavior before the
contest for the new constituency is held. The key conclusion from this literature on
political ambition and legislative behavior is that we cannot simply treat legislators
as ‘single-minded re-election seekers’ in their current career positions. Rather, for
many legislators their behavior will be shaped by the specific political constituency
they hope to serve in the future.8
In most studies political careers are assumed to be hierarchically organized:
from the local, to the regional (state), to the national (federal) level. In the US
context, for example, research has shown that politicians have ambitions to ‘move
upwards’ from the state level to the federal level, and that state and federal levels of
government provide different incentives and rewards for politicians.9 Nevertheless,
career paths in other countries are often less clear-cut. Studies of political careers
in federal systems have shown that while many politicians aspire to ‘move up’,
others see their regional or state office functions as the main focus of their careers.10
Hence, in multi-level systems it is useful to distinguish between a progressive
ambition, which implies that a legislator seeks to leave his or her current legis-
5Schlesinger 1966.
6For example Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Carey 1996.
7Hibbing 1986.
8Mayhew 1974.
9Schlesinger 1966; Francis and Kenny 2000.
10Stolz 2003; Stolz 2011; Scarrow 1997; Borchert 2011.
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lature chamber and move to a another level of government (without assuming
uni-directionality), in contrast to a static ambition, which implies that a legislator
wishes to build a career within his or her current legislature.11 Depending on the
specific institutional context, the predominant ambition among legislators may
be static, seeking re-election, or progressive, seeking to move either ‘up’ from the
state level to the federal level (e.g. in the United States), ‘down’ from federal level
to state/subnational level (e.g. in Brazil), or indeed ‘across’ between the regional
and federal levels (e.g. in Catalonia). Legislative behavior in Brazil, for example,
has shown that political ambition of Brazilian legislators focuses on the subna-
tional (municipal and state) level.12 Yet, in line with ambition theory, Samuels
demonstrates that even while serving in the national legislature, Brazilian legisla-
tors act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as
‘ambassadors’ of subnational governments. Similarly, Carey finds that Costa Ri-
can legislators, who are constitutionally restricted to a single term in the national
legislative assembly, compete to align themselves with key party leaders, who are
best placed to help them secure a post-legislative administrative appointment.13
In a European context, Stolz points to integrated career paths at the regional
and federal levels for Catalan politicians, whereas there are distinctly alternative
career paths in Scotland.14
We argue that to understand how such ambitions shape legislative behavior
in multilevel systems, electoral institutions are a key conditioning variable. It is
well known that electoral systems shape how politicians campaign and how they
11See Schlesinger 1966; Samuels 2000; Samuels 2003; Borchert 2011; Cunow et al. 2012.
12Samuels 2003; Desposato 2006.
13Carey 1996.
14Stolz 2011.
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behave once elected; such as how responsive politicians are to legislative party
leaders or which legislative committees they choose to join.15 We know far less
about how electoral rules moderate the effect of career ambitions on legislative
behavior. There is some existing research on this question. For example, Cox
et al. and Pekkanen et al. examine how variations in electoral rules moderate
the effect of career ambitions on factionalism in the Japanese Diet.16 Similarly,
Jun and Hix find that the structure of candidate selection South Korea shapes
individual parliamentary behavior of legislators.17
Where career incentives are concerned, one key aspect of the electoral system
is the difference between ‘candidate-centered’ and ‘party-centered’ systems.18 In
candidate-centered systems, the ballot structure allows voters to choose between
candidates from the same political party, as in the open-list proportional repre-
sentation systems or under single-transferable vote. In party-centered systems, in
contrast, the ballot structure only allows voters to choose between pre-ordered lists
of candidates presented by parties, as in the closed-list proportional representation
systems.19
In candidate-centered electoral systems, legislators who want to be elected need
to develop their name recognition among voters in their constituency regardless
of which office they are seeking to be elected to. Career prospects in a candidate-
centered electoral system therefore depend in large part on the candidate’s ability
15For exampler Ames 1995; Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998; Stratmann and Baur 2002;
Hix 2004; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Chang and Golden 2006.
16Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 2000; Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 2006.
17Jun and Hix 2010.
18Carey and Shugart 1995; Hix 2004; Farrell and McAllister 2006; Farrell and Scully 2007.
19In the empirical section, we move beyond this distinction to test the effect of career ambition
on participation within the different types of electoral systems used in European Parliament
elections.
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to cultivate personal identification and support amongst the electorate. For leg-
islators who want to continue their political career at the current institution, low
participation rates may be an electoral liability. But, for politicians elected under
candidate-centered electoral institutions, any potential electoral cost of campaign-
ing rather than participating, and hence appearing to shirk on ones responsibilities
inside the legislature, would be heavily outweighed by the positive benefits of rais-
ing ones profile amongst the voters.
This argument is in line with formal work, such as Ashworth’s model of how
legislators trade off legislative participation vis-a`-vis constituency service under
different legislative arrangements.20 An implication of this model is that legislators
devote relatively more effort to constituency activities if voters can distinguish
between support for a party and support for an individual candidate in the ballot
box. Moreover, this trade-off in favor of campaigning over legislative participation
is likely to be higher for legislators seeking a career in another legislative arena
than for those seeking to continue in their current arena, since for this latter
group low legislative participation may be seen as a liability. In a party-centered
electoral system, in contrast, it is usually sufficient for the legislator to be on good
terms with the party leaders who control candidate selection to keep his or her
position.21
We now turn to how electoral rules and career ambitions interact to shape
legislative behavior in the specific multi-level context of the European Union.
20Ashworth and Mesquita 2006.
21Jones et al. 2002.
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Participation, Ambitions and Electoral Rules in the European Parlia-
ment
The EU is a pertinent example of multi-level career paths. As in other legislatures
in multi-level systems, Members of the European Parliament typically follow one
of three career paths: some advance within the European Parliament itself, others
see the European Parliament as a stepping-stone to a more coveted legislative or
executive position in their home country, while a third group leave politics alto-
gether or retire. The key contrast is between the first two types of MEPs: 1) those
who have ‘static ambitions’, who seek to build a career in Brussels; and 2) those
who have ‘progressive ambitions’, who seek a career ‘back home’.22 For example,
Daniel finds that as the powers of the European Parliament have grown, and the
related professionalization of the chamber has increased, the proportion of MEPs
who have a static career ambition, and hence seek re-election to the European
Parliament, has also grown.23 Politicians with these static ambitions need to un-
dertake tasks that are important to party leaders inside the European Parliament,
to increase their prominence within the institution. However, these politicians
also need to please those who control their re-selection and re-election, who tend
to be located at the national level.24 These national selectors do prefer to renomi-
nate MEPs, everything else equal.25. In contrast, politicians who seek to move to
the national arena are less concerned with developing their prominence within the
European Parliament. Instead, their key concern is to make it plausible that they
are capable of conducting tasks associated with holding national office, such as
22Scarrow 1997; Stolz 2003.
23Daniel 2015.
24Norris 1997.
25Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard 2015.
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being visible in the national media and cultivating ties with the national leader-
ship in order to secure an attractive post if successful in entering national politics.
Hence, the focus of these politicians, with progressive career ambitions, will not
be on pleasing those who control promotion inside the European Parliament or re-
selection/re-election to the European Parliament. Instead, their primary interest
will be to cater to the gatekeepers of political office at the national level. Indeed,
work on career ambition in the European Parliament has shown that MEPs who
aim to return to national politics are more likely to vote against their legislative
party groups and oppose legislation that enhances the power of the EU’s supra-
national institutions. Using age as a proxy for career ambition, Meserve et al.
find that those with progressive career ambitions (younger) are more likely to vote
against their European political groups than those (older) MEPs with static career
ambitions.26 Similarly, Daniel finds that more senior MEPs, who have had a longer
static career in the European Parliament, are more likely to win ‘rapporteurships’
(legislative report-writing positions).27
To identify the interaction between electoral rules and career ambitions in shap-
ing legislative behavior in the EU we focus on one particular aspect of legislative
behavior: legislative participation. Participation can be regarded as a pivotal indi-
cator of a legislator’s ‘valence’ (e.g. his or her quality, commitment, or diligence).28
Conversely, absenteeism and low involvement in legislative activities can be seen
as a sign of shirking.29 Participation may also influence the re-election chances
of legislators. However, the personal valence of politicians plays a less significant
26Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009.
27Daniel 2015.
28cf. Hix 2004; Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009.
29Galasso and Nannicini 2011.
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role in electoral competition for seats in lower salience legislatures, such regional or
state-level legislatures, since the lack of media attention to these legislative bodies
makes it far harder for voters to monitor and sanction the behavior of politicians
in these legislatures. This is relevant in our context given that for voters, parties,
and candidates, elections to national political office are more highly valued and
highly salient than elections to the European Parliament.30
Of course, career ambitions are not the only motivation that guides legislative
behavior. Legislators are also policy-seekers who are driven to participate to fulfill
certain policy goals.31 Yet, all other things being equal, we expect that career am-
bitions are an important factor shaping parliamentary behavior. Consistent with
the existing literature on careers and legislative behavior, we thus argue that legis-
lators optimize their behavior in light of their career goals.32 There are competing
demands on legislators’ time, such as scrutinizing legislation, constituency service,
participation in public debates, and work in the party organization.33 Moreover,
because each of these activities matter more to some voters and candidate-selectors
than others, legislators need to engage in the optimal combination of activities to
maximize their chances of reaching their career goals. Specifically, for a legislator
to be trusted with an office, he or she needs to make the case to the key gatekeep-
ers to that office that he or she is capable of conducting the tasks of the office in
an appropriate manner and in the interests of the gatekeepers.
Here, the electoral institutions come into play. Despite Europe-wide ‘direct’
elections to the European Parliament since 1979, and repeated efforts to establish
30Schmitt 2005; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007.
31Strøm and Mu¨ller 1999.
32Schlesinger 1966; Hibbing 1986; Samuels 2003; Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009.
33Hazan and Rahat 2010.
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a uniform electoral system, there is still considerable discretion for each member
state to determine the precise rules for electing MEPs (as long as a proportional
electoral system is used). Where the ballot structure is concerned, about half of the
EU’s states used a candidate-centered system (either open-list proportional rep-
resentation or single-transferable-vote), while the other half use a party-centered
system (closed-list proportional representation). In most of the states that use
party-centered electoral systems, the lists of candidates are drawn up by central
party leaderships. Even in the two states with party-centered systems and regional
constituencies – France and the United Kingdom – the central party leaderships
influence the order of the lists, by deciding whether candidates can re-stand in the
elections and formally approving any new candidates.
Within party-centered electoral systems, where the party has considerable in-
fluence over the individual MEP, a legislator’s active involvement in parliamentary
activities has a positive influence on his or her career prospects at the European
level. The national party is more likely to want to re-select an MEP for a seat in
the European Parliament if she has actively participated in legislative activities.
Equally, an MEP who has her heart set on a second or third term in Brussels is
more likely to prioritize legislative activities inside the Parliament if she knows
that the relevant gatekeepers are going to take notice. While the party leader-
ships will take notice of politicians’ activity levels, because of the low salience
of European Parliament elections, voters are largely ignorant of the day-to-day
activities of MEPs. However, while voters pay limited attention to activities in
the European Parliament, research has shown that candidate characteristics and
campaign activities may influence their re-election chances.34
34Hobolt and Høyland 2011; Hobolt and Spoon 2012.
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Given that the career prospects of candidates hinge on the party leadership in
party-centered systems, we would expect that those MEPs who have ambitions to
stay at the European level to be far more engaged in legislative activities in the
Parliament. Moreover, politicians who would like to progress to the national level
can still spend time in the legislature conditional on the national party leadership
being supportive of their move to national level politics, since national party lead-
ership support is sufficient for a successful transition to national politics (assuming
electoral support for the party does not collapse).
In contrast, the career prospects of a politician in a candidate-centered electoral
system depend to a larger extent on the candidate’s ability to cultivate personal
identification and support amongst the electorate. Hence, there are fewer incen-
tives for politicians elected in these systems to participate in legislative work in
their current legislature, in particular for legislators seeking to continue their career
at another level. We therefore expect more distinct differences in legislative par-
ticipation between legislators with national level ambitions in candidate-centered
systems, and a clearer distinction between politicians with static and progressive
career ambitions in party-centered systems.
This consequently leads us to the following hypotheses about career ambitions
and legislative participation in multi-level systems, and about the moderating
effect of the electoral system on the relationship between career ambitions and
participation:
H1: Politicians with (static) European level career ambitions are more likely to
participate than politicians with (progressive) national level career ambi-
tions.
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H2: The difference in participation attributed to differences in career ambitions
is more pronounced in candidate-centered than in party-centered electoral
systems.
In the next section, we discuss the data and methods that allow us to test
these hypotheses.
Data and Empirical Estimation
As discussed, the European Parliament provides an excellent case for investigating
these propositions because multiple electoral systems operate within the same in-
stitutional setting. Although legislation on the uniformity of electoral procedures
in European Parliament elections was enacted in 2003 (according to which all
elections to the European Parliament shall be held under a proportional electoral
system), there continues to be considerable variation in the ballot structure, dis-
trict magnitude and candidate selection rules across the EU member states. There
are some within-country differences in electoral systems applied for European Par-
liament and national parliamentary elections, in particular after the unification of
the European Parliament electoral rules.35 However, these differences are not con-
sequential for classifying an electoral system as candidate or party-centered.
A further strength of our study is that we examine the effect of our primary
explanatory variable, career ambition type, using two unique indicators of both
‘realized’ ambitions and ‘stated’ ambitions. Previous research on ambition has
relied on proxies, such as age, to measure MEPs’ ambition.36 We use actual mea-
sures of stated career ambition, using survey data on MEPs’ future ambitions,
35Farrell and Scully 2005.
36Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009.
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as well as realized ambition, using observed data on MEPs’ actual careers. The
advantage of the former measure is that it captures subjective ambitions prior to
legislative participation for a subset of MEPs, whereas the advantage of the latter
measure is that it provides us with actual biographical data on all MEPs in the
period under investigation. In combination these measures provide a rigorous test
of the effect of ambitions on legislative behavior.
To achieve this, our empirical analysis focuses on 2,094 MEPs who were elected
to serve in any period between the 4th and the 7th sessions of the European Par-
liament (1994-2014), since this allows us to obtain good quality data on pre-EP
careers and ambitions as well as post-EP careers. As several MEPs served in more
than one term, we have 3,341 observations in total. In line with previous work,
we distinguish between three types of career ambitious amongst MEPs: national
(progressive), European (static), and non-political careers.37 For data on post-EP
careers (realized ambition), we conducted a systematic search, consulting a range
of online resources, such as the official webpage of the European Parliament and
national parliaments, webpages of European and national parties and individual
politicians, complemented by EU Who is Who. We classified post-EP careers as
either: 1) National political career ; 2) European political career ; or 3) Non-political
career. The national political career category includes MEPs who went on to be-
come members of the national parliament or members of the national cabinet,
either within a year (post-EP career) or at some point within the following 5 years
(within 5 years career). The European political career category includes MEPs
who remained members of the European Parliament or became European Com-
missioners. All others are classified as having a non-political career or retired.
37See Scarrow 1997.
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To capture ‘stated’ career ambitions we used survey data on MEPs collected in
2000, 2005 and 2010.38 This allows us to compare stated and realized ambitions
for a subset of the MEPs who responded to the survey. The survey question was
worded as follows:
What would you like to be doing 10 years from now? (Choose as many boxes
as you wish)
• Member of the European Parliament
• Chair of a European Parliament committee
• Chair of a European political group
• Member of a national parliament
• Member of a national government
• European Commissioner
• Retired from public life
• Something else, please specify.
Over the course of the three surveys, there was a total of 727 respondents.
Some MEPs participated in the surveys in several Parliaments. As a result, we
have a total of 591 distinct MEPs in this dataset. The respondents to the survey
were not significantly different from the population of MEPs on key variables,
such as European political group, member state, or gender.39 Respondents who
answered ‘Member of the European Parliament’, ‘Chair of a European Parliament
committee’, ‘Chair of a European political group’, or ‘European Commissioner’
as seeking a European level career. MEPs who answered ‘Member of a national
38Farrell, Hix, and Scully 2011.
39See Scully, Hix, and Farrell 2012.
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parliament’ or ‘Member of a national government’ are coded as seeking a national
level career.
To measure our dependent variable, we consider two types of legislative par-
ticipation: voting, and speeches in debates. Voting and speeches are the two main
activities that legislators engage in in the plenary sessions, and have been the sub-
ject of numerous studies.40 For these two types of behavior we look at two different
ways of measuring ‘participation’. When considering voting participation, we look
at all roll-call votes as well as participation in at least one vote on a given day
where at least one roll-call vote was requested. We use all data from 20 years of
voting and attendance records, from 1994 to 2014, EP4 to EP7. Some concern
has been raised that findings based on roll-call votes in the European Parliament
may be biased, as roll-call votes do not represent a random sample of all votes. In
particular, many roll-call votes are taken on non-binding, and lop-sided, resolu-
tions.41 But as we rely on both voting and attendance records, our results should
be less sensitive to such bias. In addition, in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix,
we repeat the analysis on legislative votes and close votes (where the difference
between Yes and No was less than 100). Also, as there may be substantive dif-
ferences across national parties, Table A4 reports the results from models with
national party and legislative term random intercepts. All these results are in line
with those presented in the results section.
Similarly, for participation in plenary debates, we consider all speeches by
an MEP, given all speeches made during the time the MEP serviced, as well as
the number of days with plenary debates where an MEP participated at least
40Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Slapin and Proksch 2014.
41Carrubba et al. 2005; Hug 2010; Yordanova and Mu¨hlbo¨ck 2015.
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once, given all days he or she could have participated. Proksch and Slapin pro-
vide a comparative analysis of participation in debates, demonstrating that there
is variation in party leadership control by electoral institutions, arguing that in
candidate-centered systems, constituency based critiques of the policies of the
party leadership is more welcomed.42 Due to the availability of debates in an elec-
tronic format, we are limited in our analysis to the the most recent 15 years,
1999-2014 (EP5 to EP7).
To test our second hypothesis we need to operationalize the key moderat-
ing variable: the electoral system. As discussed, the most important distinction
for our purpose is between candidate-centered and party-centered systems, which
concerns the degree to which the ballot structure allows voters to determine the
fate of individual candidates. In the main models, we follow Farrell and Scully,
supplemented by our own reading of the electoral rules in the 2009 elections.
We classify closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) as party-centered, and
single-transferable vote (STV), open-list proportional representation (OLPR), and
single-member plurality (SMP) as candidate-centered.43 To ensure that the career
effect holds within the different systems, we also run a model where the effect of
career ambitions is analyzed separately for each type of electoral system. In order
to capture how electoral institutions shape behavior through the re-election in-
centives they create, rather than the selection effects, we consider the prospective
system an MEP is likely to run under in the next election, not the system he or
she was elected under. The distribution of MEPs by career ambition and electoral
institutions are presented in Table 1.44
42Proksch and Slapin 2015.
43Farrell and Scully 2007.
44An overview of the distribution of MEPs by career ambitions and electoral systems are
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Table 1: Career Ambitions by Electoral Institutions
Party Centered Candidate Centered
European Career 1095 367
National Career 227 127
Other 1030 550
Note: Party Centered Systems: Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Greece (- 2009), Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and United
Kingdom.
Candidate Centered Systems: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Den-
mark, Greece (2014), Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, and Sweden.
We see that most MEPs are elected in party-centered systems, and there is a
higher proportion of MEPs with national level political ambitions in candidate-
centered systems. But in these systems there is also relatively more MEPs who
plan to leave politics. This suggests that there may be a difference in who becomes
an MEP across the two systems.
Results
We begin our analysis of participation in roll-call votes by a simple comparison
of participation levels given career ambition conditional on the type of electoral
institutions.
Table 2 shows that those who seek to continue as an MEP participate more
than both those MEPs who seek a career at the national level as well as those who
seek to leave politics. Also, MEPs who seek a national level career participate least.
This holds for both candidate- and party-centered systems. Also, within career
ambition types, MEPs from party-centered systems participate more. In Table
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Participation in Roll Call Votes by Career Ambition, and Conditional on
Electoral Institutions
All Candidate Centered Party Centered
European Career 0.77 0.71 0.79
National Career 0.66 0.58 0.70
Other 0.72 0.65 0.77
Note: Percentage of Roll Call Votes participated in, out of all roll
call votes in the period each MEP served.
3, we show that this pattern holds when we consider presence in the European
Parliament, as measured by participating in at least one roll-call vote per day.
However, here we notice that the difference between those who seek to stay on
and those who leave politics is smaller.
Table 3: Participation (days with rcvs), by Career Ambitions, and Conditional on
Electoral Institutions
All Candidate Centered Party Centered
European Career 0.58 0.54 0.60
National Career 0.48 0.49 0.48
Other 0.57 0.54 0.60
Note: Percentage of days with Roll Call Votes that MEPs voted in
at least one roll-call vote, out of all days roll call votes in the period
each MEP served.
In Table 4, we present the results from a more sophisticated statistical anal-
ysis. The statistical models are hierarchical binomial, taking number of votes
cast (model 1 and 3), or active voting days (model 2), given the number of to-
tal votes (models 1 and 3), or total voting days (model 2), as the dependent
variable. Our explanatory variables are the combinations of career ambition and
electoral institutions. We control for background in national politics, incumbency
in the European Parliament, age and leadership roles in the committees and the
European political groups. We also include political group, member state and
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legislative term specific intercepts. In model 3, we use electoral systems rather
than the binary candidate- vs party- centered system. Note that the inclusion of
intercepts for political groups, member states and parliamentary terms allow us
to average over differences across countries, political groups, and over time.45
We see that the patterns from the bivariate analysis hold even when controlling
for other variables, such as political group, member states, and legislative term.
In line with our hypotheses, we see that career ambition matters for participa-
tion in votes. MEPs with national career ambitions participate less than those
with European level career ambitions. The reference category is European career
ambitions in a party-centered system. In Model 1, we see that the difference in
participation as a function of career ambition is larger in candidate-centered sys-
tems than in party-centered systems. However, in Model 2, where we only count
participation in at least one vote per voting-day, the difference across the electoral
institutions is harder to detect. This in in line with the pattern we would expect to
see if MEPs with national career ambitions from candidate-centered systems were
more likely than other MEPs to either arrive late or leave early in order to attend
extra-parliamentary events in their constituencies. This finding is supported by
a recent study that demonstrates that electoral institutions impact the outreach
strategies of MEPs on Twitter. Notably, these other results show greater social
media activity by MEPs in candidate-centered systems.46
In Model 3, we depart from the binary distinction of candidate- vs party-
centered systems to investigate the difference in behavior as a result of career
45The models are estimated in JAGS, Plummer 2015, We ran three chains from dispersed
starting points for 500,000 iterations, keeping each 25th iteration from the last 250,000 iterations.
Convergence tests suggest that the all parameters have converged during the first half of the
chains. We are left with 30,000 draws from the posterior distribution.
46Obholzer and Daniel 2016.
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Table 4: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: Participation in Roll Call Votes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EP incumbent -0.098 -0.138 -0.124
[-0.101 , -0.095] [-0.152 , -0.125] [-0.127 , -0.121]
National background -0.197 -0.171 -0.225
[-0.201 , -0.194] [-0.189 , -0.152] [-0.229 , -0.221]
Non-political career -0.057 0.011 0.153
[-0.06 , -0.054] [-0.003 , 0.026] [0.147 , 0.158]
Age -0.084 0.204 0.046
[-0.097 , -0.07] [0.139 , 0.267] [0.032 , 0.06]
Leader (Group) 0.052 0.065 0.055
[0.049 , 0.055] [0.051 , 0.078] [0.052 , 0.058]
Leader (Committee) 0.062 0.048 0.059
[0.059 , 0.065] [0.034 , 0.063] [0.056 , 0.062]
National (Candidate) -0.359 -0.124
[-0.367 , -0.35] [-0.165 , -0.083]
National (Party) -0.272 -0.152
[-0.278 , -0.267] [-0.178 , -0.126]
EU (Candidate) 0.061 0.04
[0.055 , 0.067] [0.013 , 0.066]
CLPR (national) -0.085
[-0.094 , -0.077]
CLPR (EP) 0.221
[0.215 , 0.227]
CLPR/STV (EP) 0.232
[0.223 , 0.242]
Semi-OLPR (National) 0.069
[0.053 , 0.085]
Semi-OLPR (EP) 0.18
[0.171 , 0.19]
STV (National) 0.024
[-0.006 , 0.053]
STV (EP) 0.197
[0.18 , 0.214]
OLPR (EP) 0.303
[0.296 , 0.31]
SMP/STV (National) -0.077
[-0.092 , -0.063]
Political group intercepts Yes Yes Yes
Member state intercepts Yes Yes Yes
EP intercept Yes Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for po-
litical groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent
Variable: Participation in Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all). Estimates
are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabilty intervals.
22
ambitions within each system. The reference category here is MEPs with national
career ambitions in open-list proportional representation systems. In line with
our first hypothesis, career ambitions matter for participation in votes across all
systems. Within each electoral system, MEPs with national level career-ambitions
participate in fewer votes than MEPs with European level ambitions. The pattern
holds within each type of electoral system.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the substantive moderating effect of electoral institu-
tions given career ambition on participation in votes in EP7 (2009-14). As exam-
ples of MEPs from party-centered systems, we selected French Social Democrats
(P&S), German Christian Democrats (EPP). These are presented in the top row
of the figure. As examples of MEPs from candidate-centered systems, we se-
lected Italian Social Democrats (P&S) and Finnish Conservatives (EPP). These
are presented in the bottom row. Two aspects are clear from the figure. First,
the difference in the level of participation is substantively larger in candidate-
centered systems than in party-centered systems. Also, the level of participation
varies across countries within these two types of systems. For example, French
MEPs participate less than German MEPs and Italian MEPs participate less than
Finnish MEPs. Daniel links such differences between member states with similar
electoral institutions to differences in the party systems.47 This is an interesting
suggestion, but outside the scope of this paper, where our focus is the effect of
electoral institutions on career ambitions.
47Daniel 2015.
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Votes (Party Centered)
French Social Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Votes (Party Centered)
German Christian Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
National
European
Votes (Candidate Centered)
Italian Social Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Votes (candidate Centered)
Finnish Conservatives EP 7
National vs European Career
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
National
European
Figure 1: Moderating effect of electoral institutions given career ambition on vot-
ing.
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Participation in Debates
Next, we investigate to what extent we can find a similar pattern for parliamentary
debates. We begin by investigating aggregate differences in mean participation
rates across electoral institutions and career ambitions, in Table 5. As with votes,
we see that MEPs with European career ambitions participate more than those
with national career ambitions.
Table 5: Participation in Plenary Debates, by Career Ambition, and Conditional
on Electoral Institutions
All Candidate Centered Party Centered
European Career 0.13 0.15 0.12
National Career 0.09 0.10 0.08
Other 0.12 0.13 0.12
Note: Percentage of days with debates MEPs participated in, out
of all days with debates in the period each MEP served.
In Table 6, we run a similar set of models, but using debates instead of votes
as our dependent variable. In Model 4 the dependent variable is the number of
speeches out of all speeches occurring during the period an MEP was a member.
In model 5 we use the number of days an MEP participated in a debate given
all the days with debates during the period he or she was a member. Model 6
replicates Model 4, but using electoral systems interacted with career ambitions.
The key results are consistent with those reported in the previous subsection,
on votes. MEPs with national career ambitions participate less than those with
European career ambitions. When we count all speeches, the difference is larger in
candidate-centered systems than in party-centered systems. Again, this difference
disappears if we use the number of days with a speech (Model 4) instead of the
number of speeches (Model 5), which is consistent with these MEPs missing part
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Table 6: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: Participation in Debates
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
EP incumbent 0.116 0.191 0.191
[0.104 , 0.128] [0.171 , 0.21] [0.171 , 0.211]
National background 0.214 0.085 0.084
[0.199 , 0.229] [0.059 , 0.11] [0.058 , 0.111]
Non-political career -0.118 -0.182 0.237
[-0.13 , -0.105] [-0.202 , -0.161] [0.169 , 0.304]
Age -2.296 -1.684 -1.655
[-2.345 , -2.247] [-1.769 , -1.6] [-1.739 , -1.57]
Leader (Group) 0.067 0.08 0.083
[0.054 , 0.079] [0.061 , 0.1] [0.063 , 0.103]
Leader (Committee) 0.174 0.123 0.128
[0.161 , 0.186] [0.103 , 0.143] [0.108 , 0.147]
National (Candidate) -0.584 -0.418
[-0.631 , -0.539] [-0.482 , -0.354]
National (Party) -0.313 -0.373
[-0.34 , -0.286] [-0.413 , -0.333]
EU (Candidate) -0.1 -0.045
[-0.122 , -0.078] [-0.081 , -0.008]
CLPR (national) 0.007
[-0.075 , 0.089]
CLPR (EP) 0.356
[0.285 , 0.428]
CLPR/STV (EP) 0.655
[0.568 , 0.744]
Semi-OLPR (National) 0.235
[0.114 , 0.355]
Semi-OLPR (EP) 0.478
[0.398 , 0.56]
STV (National) 0.054
[-0.102 , 0.21]
STV (EP) 0.516
[0.405 , 0.625]
OLPR (EP) 0.355
[0.287 , 0.423]
SMP/STV (National) 0.061
[-0.08 , 0.202]
Political group intercepts Yes Yes Yes
Member state intercepts Yes Yes Yes
EP intercept Yes Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for po-
litical groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent
Variable: Dependent variable: particiaption in debates (all, at least
once that day, at least once that day). Estimates are posterior mode
and 95 percent posterior probabilty intervals.
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of the plenary sessions due to engagements outside the chamber, which forces them
to leave early or arrive late more often than their counterparts in party-centered
systems. Also, in Model 6, we see that higher participation for those MEPs with
European career ambitions than MEPs with national career ambitions holds in
every pair of electoral systems.
The patterns in the control variables are consistent cross model-specifications.
Political experience, both at the European and the national levels is associated
with more plenary speeches. In contrast, there is a negative correlation between
age and participation in plenary debates. Unsurprisingly, both the group and com-
mittee leaders speak more often during the plenary sessions than ’backbenchers’.
In Figure 2, we compare participation in debates across electoral institutions,
using the same examples as above. While we see that there are smaller substantive
differences by career ambitions, we nevertheless notice a distinct difference between
party- and candidate- centered systems. In the latter, we are able to detect two
different peaks in the distribution. MEPs with European level career ambitions
tend to participate more than MEPs with national level ambitions in candidate-
centered systems. There is hardly any detectable difference in party-centered
systems.
Stated Career Ambitions
Finally, we evaluate to what extent we find similar patterns when considering
’stated’ rather than ’realized’ career ambitions. The descriptive relationship be-
tween career ambitions and votes is presented in Table 7, and in the case of debates
27
Debates (Party Centered)
French Social Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
National
European
Debates (Party Centered)
German Christian Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Debates (Candidate Centered)
Italian Social Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
National
European
Debates (Candidate Centered)
Finnish Conservatives EP 7
National vs European Career
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Figure 2: Moderating effect of electoral institutions given career ambition on
speeches.
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Table 7: Survey: Future Career, Electoral Institutions, and Particiaption in Votes
All Candidate Centered Party Centered
European Career 0.84 0.81 0.86
National Career 0.78 0.72 0.81
Other 0.81 0.80 0.81
Note: Percentage of days with Roll Call Votes that MEPs voted in
at least one roll-call vote, out of all days roll call votes in the period
each MEP served.
the relationship is presented in Table 8.48
Table 8: Survey: Future Career, Electoral Institutions, and Particiaption in De-
bates
All Candidate Centered Party Centered
European Career 0.16 0.21 0.14
National Career 0.12 0.12 0.12
Other 0.12 0.14 0.10
Note: Percentage of days with debates MEPs participated in, out
of all days with debates in the period each MEP served.
The tables show that for participation in both votes and debates, those MEPs
who seek a long-term European career participate more. Also, the difference in
participation by career ambition is larger in candidate-centered systems than in
party-centered systems.
These descriptive results are encouraging, and Table 9 investigates whether
the patterns also hold in a more sophisticated model. For the survey based career
ambition variable, we show the correlation between career ambitions and partici-
pation in roll-call votes in model 7. Then, in model 8, we focus on debates. We
use the same control variables and structure as in the previous models, i.e. mem-
48We see that, across all activities, in both sets of electoral institutions and across different
career ambitions, those that answered the survey had higher participation levels than those
MEPs analyzed above. The differences across career ambition and electoral institutions are
robust to changes in how career ambition is measured.
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Table 9: Hierarical binomial models. Survey: Votes and Speeches
Model 7 Model 8
National (Candidate) -0.216 -0.511
[-0.234 , -0.197] [-0.629 , -0.395]
National (Party) -0.277 -0.388
[-0.289 , -0.265] [-0.464 , -0.313]
EU (Candidate) 0.203 0.12
[0.191 , 0.215] [0.057 , 0.182]
EP incumbent -0.092 0.302
[-0.099 , -0.086] [0.267 , 0.336]
National background -0.039 0.183
[-0.047 , -0.03] [0.137 , 0.228]
Non-political career -0.1 -0.087
[-0.107 , -0.093] [-0.125 , -0.049]
Age 0.629 -1.489
[0.602 , 0.657] [-1.641 , -1.333]
Leader (Group) 0.09 0.103
[0.084 , 0.095] [0.071 , 0.136]
Leader (Committee) 0.068 0.134
[0.061 , 0.074] [0.1 , 0.167]
Political group intercepts Yes Yes
Member state intercepts Yes Yes
EP intercept Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for po-
litical groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent
Variable: Participation in Roll Call Votes (Model 7) and in debates
(Model 8). Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior
probabilty intervals.
30
ber state, political group, and legislative term random intercepts. As above, we
control for previous experience, age and leadership roles in the political groups
and committees.
The patterns from the ’stated’ survey results are similar to the above results
that relied on ’realized’ career ambitions. Career ambitions matter for partici-
pation, and more so in candidate-centered systems. MEPs seeking to move to
the national arena participate less than MEPs who want to stay on in the Eu-
ropean Parliament. The effect of career ambitions on participation is larger in
candidate-centered systems than in party-centered systems.
For the control variables, the patterns are as expected. The MEPs who said
that they planned to leave politics tended to have higher participation rates than
those MEPs who were aiming for a national career, but lower participation rates
than MEPs who planned to stay on in the European Parliament. Political ex-
perience, both national and European, is associated with lower participation in
votes but higher participation in speeches. Older MEPs, for whatever reason,
vote more, but are less likely to speak. Unsurprisingly, political group leaders
participate in more votes and speak more often than backbenchers. Committee
chairs (and vice-chairs) are more active than backbenchers across both types of
participation.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the substantive effects of stated career ambition, given
electoral institutions. We illustrate the effect with French and Italian Christian
Democrats in EP7 (2009-14). We see that there is a substantively larger difference
in participation as a function of stated career ambitions among Italian MEPs than
among French MEPs. When we compare across activities, we see the same pattern
when we use stated preferences as we found for realized preferences. The career
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effect is largest when access to the activity is not scarce (in votes). Alternatively,
making speeches may be highly valuable to MEPs from party-centered systems
as it may be an opportunity for individual MEPs to demonstrate their level of
policy expertise to their party leadership, and thus increase their chances of being
re-elected.
These results show a clear and consistent pattern in the case of participation
in both voting and debates. Our key findings can be summarized as follows.
MEPs with national level career ambitions participate less than MEPs who seek
a European level career. The difference is larger in candidate-centered systems.
This holds for both realized and stated career ambitions. This pattern is strongest
when participation is not a scarce good, such as in voting. The fact the one
MEP is participating in a vote does not reduce the opportunity for other MEPs to
participate in that vote. In contrast, making a speech is a scarce good, as speaking
time is limited, and MEPs have to compete with each other for speaking time in
plenary debates.
Conclusion
Politicians’ participation in legislative activities is a prerequisite for political influ-
ence. Voters whose elected representatives fail to be present in the legislature are
not represented in a meaningful way. However, for the elected politicians, partic-
ipation in legislative activities has to compete with extra-parliamentary activities
that might enhance a politician’s personal profile among his or her electorate.
Hence, it is important to examine the conditions under which politicians have
incentives to prioritize legislative work. To understand what motivates legislators
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Votes (Party Centered)
French Christian Democrats EP 7
Survey: National vs European Career
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Votes (Candidate Centered)
Italian Christian Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Debates (Party Centered)
French Christian Democrats EP 7
Survey: National vs European Career
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
National
European
Debates (Candidate Centered)
Italian Christian Democrats EP 7
National vs European Career
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
National
European
Figure 3: Moderating effect of electoral institutions given career ambition on votes
and speeches (Survey).
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in multi-level systems, we have argued that not only do career ambitions shape
legislative behavior, but electoral systems also influence how legislators respond
to these incentives.
To examine this argument empirically, we have taken advantage of the Eu-
ropean Parliament setting, where politicians are elected under different electoral
systems in each EU member state. Using unique data on both the stated career
ambitions (from surveys) and the realized career ambitions (from post-parliament
careers) of the MEPs, we demonstrate that politicians with ‘progressive’ career
ambitions, who use the European Parliament as a stepping-stone to a national
career, are less active in the legislature than those MEP with ‘static’ ambitions,
who wish to continue their political career at the European level.
Moreover, contrasting candidate-centered electoral systems with party-centered
electoral systems, we find that even those representatives who seek to continue
their careers at the European level have lower levels of participation if they were
elected in candidate-centered electoral systems than in party-centered electoral
systems. This, we argue, is because politicians in candidate-centered systems
need to be visible to voters to be able to win the within-party competition for
electoral sypport. In contrast, politicians elected in party-centered systems sim-
ply need to please the ‘selectorate’ in the party leadership. That task can more
easily be achieved by focusing on legislative activities. We also find that the effect
of electoral institutions in legislative participation is greater for politicians who
seek to return to national politics: with candidate-centered rules leading to lower
legislative participation than party-centered rules.
These findings have potentially important implications for representation in
the European Union and beyond. Although we can assume that most voters
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would like their elected representatives to participate in the legislative activities
of the institution in which they serve, our results suggest that party-centered elec-
toral systems are more likely to encourage politicians to invest significant time
and efforts in legislative activities. In contrast, in candidate-centered systems,
even politicians who want to pursue a long-term career inside their current legis-
lature have few incentives to engage in legislative activities, since their re-election
depends on their links with local constituents. Such electoral systems reward
politicians who raise their profiles among local voters and party members.49 In
the EU context, participation in European Parliament committees and plenary
sessions is barely noticed beyond Brussels. While the European Parliament is
dependent on members who are prepared to commit themselves to the legislative
activities in such a way that the European Parliament is able to strengthen its
hand in its dealings with other EU institutions, it seems that the incentives to
do so are largely confined to those politicians who wish to stay in the European
Parliament and who are elected in party-centered systems.
These findings are also likely to have relevance for other legislatures. The EU
may be seen as peculiar in that the hierarchy of career paths in the EU is reversed
compared to many other multi-level systems, since the European Parliament is
often regarded as the less coveted ‘lower’ legislature. However, most political sys-
tems have a hierarchy of legislatures with some that are regarded as ‘lower salience’
and where voter attention to legislative activity is limited and hence where the
mechanism of electoral selection and monitoring does not work as efficiently as in
more highly salient elections. In such legislatures, we would expect similar mech-
anisms of career ambition (static or progressive) to shape legislative participation,
49See also Ariga 2015.
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conditioned by the electoral system in place. Research on legislative behavior in
countries with mixed-member electoral systems suggests that whether a politician
is elected in a (candidate-centered) single-member district or a (party-centered)
party-list influences how the politician behaves in the legislature and in his or her
campaigning activities.50 This indicates that the conditioning effect of electoral
systems is likely to travel beyond the specific European context.
Our results consequently suggest a trade-off between two desirable outcomes
in representative democracy: on the one hand, better known or more accountable
politicians, and, on the other hand, more dedicated and professional legislators.
This trade-off is likely to be particularly acute in low-salience legislatures, like
the European Parliament or state-level or local assemblies, where legislative par-
ticipation may not enhance the public profile or re-election chances of individual
legislators in their home constituencies. One limitation of this study is there-
fore that that such a trade-off may not necessarily be as evident in high-salience
legislatures. Future research should examine whether this trade-off is a general
phenomenon or whether highly salient legislatures encourage politicians from both
candidate-centered and party-centered systems to participate in equal numbers re-
gardless of their career ambitions.
More broadly, our findings therefore present a dilemma for constitutional de-
signers in the EU and elsewhere. Existing research suggests that candidate-
centered electoral systems provide incentives for politicians to invest time cam-
paigning.51 In the EU context, these incentives lead to greater awareness about
the European Parliament and closer connections between citizens and MEPs in
50For example Ames 1995; Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998; Stratmann and Baur 2002;
Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005.
51Ames 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995.
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member states were candidate-centered systems are used, such as in Ireland, Fin-
land and Denmark.52 On the other hand, as our study has found, MEPs elected in
candidate-centered systems are less motivated to participate and engage in day-
to-day legislative activities inside the European Parliament, even if they aim to
be re-elected to that institution.
52Farrell and Scully 2007; Hix and Hagemann 2009.
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Appendix
Table A1 provides an overview of career ambitions by prospective electoral system.
Table A1: Career Ambitions by Electoral System
CLPR CLPR/STV OLPR Semi-OLPR SMP/STV STV
European Career 695 209 330 191 0 37
National Career 164 0 116 35 28 11
Other 693 0 522 199 138 28
Note: CLPR: France, Germany, Greece ( - 2009), Hungary, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, and Spain.
CLPR/STV: United Kingdom (European elections)
OLPR: Austria, Bulgaria (2014), Finland, Greece (2014), Italy, Lithu-
nia, Luxembourg, and Sweden.
Semi-OLPR: Belgium, Bulgaria (- 2009), Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
SMP: United Kingdom (National elections).
STV: Ireland, and Malta.
Now, we report the results from additional analysis of voting participation and
attendance. In particular, we first limit the votes to legislative votes only. Then,
we limit the investigation to close votes, e.i. votes where the difference between
the number of yes and no votes is less than 100. In Table A2 we report the
result form the analysis of voting participation in legislative votes. Our two key
findings remains. First, the estimate for those with a national career ambition
are lower than for those with European career ambition. Second, the difference in
participation between national and European level career is larger in candidate-
centered systems than in party centered systems. This holds for both measures of
career ambitions.
In Table A3 we only investigated participation in close votes. By close, we
mean that the difference between Yes and No votes was less than 100. Again, we
see that the two key findings hold up for both measures of career ambitions.
Then, in Table A4 we control for national parties specific effects by replacing
the political group and country specific intercepts with national party intercept.
The main pattern in the results is similar to those reported above.
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Table A2: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: Participation in Legislative Roll Call
Votes
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4
EP incumbent -0.096 -0.126 -0.108 -0.092
[-0.099 , -0.093] [-0.14 , -0.112] [-0.112 , -0.105] [-0.099 , -0.086]
National background -0.213 -0.158 -0.228 -0.039
[-0.218 , -0.209] [-0.177 , -0.139] [-0.232 , -0.224] [-0.047 , -0.03]
Non-political career -0.097 0.014 0.237 -0.1
[-0.1 , -0.093] [0 , 0.029] [0.23 , 0.245] [-0.107 , -0.093]
Age 0.078 0.26 0.114 0.629
[0.064 , 0.092] [0.194 , 0.326] [0.1 , 0.128] [0.602 , 0.657]
Leader (Group) 0.044 0.113 0.047 0.09
[0.041 , 0.048] [0.099 , 0.126] [0.043 , 0.05] [0.084 , 0.095]
Leader (Committee) 0.069 0.049 0.069 0.068
[0.066 , 0.073] [0.034 , 0.064] [0.066 , 0.072] [0.061 , 0.074]
National (Candidate) -0.419 -0.093 -0.216
[-0.428 , -0.409] [-0.135 , -0.052] [-0.234 , -0.197]
National (Party) -0.29 -0.182 -0.277
[-0.296 , -0.284] [-0.209 , -0.155] [-0.289 , -0.265]
EU (Candidate) 0.054 0.182 0.203
[0.048 , 0.06] [0.158 , 0.206] [0.191 , 0.215]
Semi-OLPR (National) 0.152
[0.135 , 0.169]
CLPR (national) 0.03
[0.02 , 0.04]
CLPR (EP) 0.331
[0.323 , 0.34]
CLPR/STV (EP) 0.426
[0.414 , 0.437]
OLPR (EP) 0.409
[0.4 , 0.417]
Semi-OLPR (EP) 0.266
[0.255 , 0.277]
STV (National) 0.146
[0.116 , 0.176]
STV (EP) 0.333
[0.314 , 0.353]
SMP/STV (National) 0.013
[-0.004 , 0.03]
Political group intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member state intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
EP intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for polit-
ical groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent Vari-
able: Participation in Legislative Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all,survey).
Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabilty in-
tervals.
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Table A3: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: Participation in Close Roll Call Votes
Model A5 Model A6 Model A7 Model A8
EP incumbent -0.096 -0.1 -0.12 -0.084
[-0.099 , -0.093] [-0.114 , -0.085] [-0.126 , -0.115] [-0.096 , -0.072]
National background -0.213 -0.132 -0.191 0.002
[-0.218 , -0.209] [-0.151 , -0.112] [-0.199 , -0.184] [-0.015 , 0.018]
Non-political career -0.097 -0.02 0.111 -0.113
[-0.1 , -0.093] [-0.034 , -0.005] [0.1 , 0.122] [-0.127 , -0.1]
Age 0.078 0.132 -0.083 0.588
[0.064 , 0.092] [0.064 , 0.2] [-0.11 , -0.055] [0.534 , 0.643]
Leader (Group) 0.044 0.085 0.057 0.074
[0.041 , 0.048] [0.072 , 0.099] [0.051 , 0.062] [0.062 , 0.085]
Leader (Committee) 0.069 0.068 0.049 0.041
[0.066 , 0.073] [0.053 , 0.083] [0.043 , 0.055] [0.029 , 0.054]
National (Candidate) -0.419 -0.166 -0.203
[-0.428 , -0.409] [-0.208 , -0.124] [-0.239 , -0.167]
National (Party) -0.29 -0.204 -0.322
[-0.296 , -0.284] [-0.232 , -0.177] [-0.345 , -0.3]
EU (Candidate) 0.054 0.085 0.133
[0.048 , 0.06] [0.059 , 0.111] [0.11 , 0.156]
Semi-OLPR (National) -0.016
[-0.046 , 0.014]
CLPR (National) -0.128
[-0.145 , -0.112]
CLPR (EP) 0.187
[0.175 , 0.199]
CLPR/STV (EP) 0.165
[0.147 , 0.184]
OLPR (EP) 0.245
[0.232 , 0.258]
Semi-OLPR (EP) 0.13
[0.112 , 0.148]
STV (National) -0.163
[-0.223 , -0.102]
STV (EP) 0.057
[0.024 , 0.091]
SMP/STV (National) -0.13
[-0.158 , -0.1]
Political group intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member state intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
EP intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for po-
litical groups, member states, and parliamentary term. Dependent
Variable: Participation in close Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all,survey).
Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabilty in-
tervals.
45
Table A4: Hierarchcial Binomial Models: National parties random effects
Model A9 Model A10
National (Candidate) -0.415 -0.304
[-0.424 , -0.406] [-0.378 , -0.231]
National (Party) -0.292 -0.36
[-0.298 , -0.286] [-0.405 , -0.316]
EU (Candidate) -0.028 0.14
[-0.034 , -0.022] [0.1 , 0.181]
EP incumbent -0.127 0.079
[-0.131 , -0.124] [0.056 , 0.102]
National background -0.167 -0.008
[-0.171 , -0.162] [-0.038 , 0.022]
Non-political career -0.089 -0.166
[-0.093 , -0.086] [-0.188 , -0.143]
Age 0.244 -1.304
[0.23 , 0.258] [-1.403 , -1.205]
Leader (Group) 0.024 0.013
[0.021 , 0.027] [-0.009 , 0.034]
Leader (Committee) 0.044 0.05
[0.041 , 0.048] [0.027 , 0.072]
EP intercept Yes Yes
National parties intercept Yes Yes
Note: Hierarchcial Binomial Models with random intercept for na-
tional parties and parliamentary term. Dependent Variable: Partic-
ipation in Roll Call Votes / Participation in Debates. Estimates are
posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabilty intervals.
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